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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
The last threat subsides  
By persuading the Council of Europe not to eject Russia from its parliamentary 
group, Moscow won a key victory in its successful campaign to mute criticism of 
the war in Chechnya. Since every major international organization has now given 
acting Russian President Vladimir Putin a honeymoon during which to show his 
true nature, Moscow will be able to host Middle East regional talks in early 
February as an unimpeached member of the international community. 
 
It was not clear, however, how Moscow would behave in the absence of 
international pressure. Would President Putin reward his Western suitors by 
winding down his country's brutal war? Or would Putin campaign in the March 
elections as the candidate who stood up to both Russia's enemies at home and 
its critics abroad? The US administration seemed prepared to gamble that Putin 
would use his mandate to restore more civil relations. But there were signs that 
the Kremlin might instead grow used to easy popularity from its diplomatic wins. 
 
The Council of Europe's decision not to employ sanctions against Russia brought 
to a close a month in which Moscow dismissed all its major critics. The surprise 
elevation of Putin, apparently an enigma to many in the West, appeared to have 
caught flat-footed even the fiercest opponents of the Chechen war. 
 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, an early advocate of NATO action in 
Yugoslavia, was calling for sanctions against Russia as recently as December. 
By late January, however, Fischer had begun insisting that the West maintain 
"open dialogue with the Russian leadership." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 25 Jan 00) 
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Italy saw fit not only to continue negotiations over economic ties to Russia, but 
even to sign new cooperative agreements with Russian arms manufacturers. 
(ITAR-TASS, 27 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
At high-level meetings of the International Monetary Fund, and the G-7, neither 
sanctions nor even statements of disapproval were supported. On 24 January 
European Union foreign ministers approved a suspension of $90 million in aid 
and expressed "concern" about Russia's behavior in the Caucasus, but declined 
to link the deferment to the Chechen war. (THE RUSSIAN BUSINESS 
MONITOR, 26 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) First Deputy Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said the suspension of aid would have few 
consequences for Russia. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 26 Jan 00; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
A council defied 
Only the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) for a time 
seriously considered punishing Russia for the brutality of its military campaign. 
Returning from a fact-finding mission in the Caucasus on 20 January, Lord David 
Russell-Johnston, president of the assembly, criticized both the Russian and 
Chechen governments. According to at least one report, Russell-Johnston said 
Russia was "in complete breach of the agreement she made when she joined the 
Council of Europe," and threatened to suspend its membership in the group. 
(THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 0636 EST, 20 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) The Russian 
media, however, treated Russell-Johnston's trip as a diplomatic victory, claiming 
that he had called Chechnya a "criminal state" and had changed his mind about 
sanctions. (RUSSIA TV, 1000 GMT, 20 Jan 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
When the parliamentary assembly considered suspending Russia's membership 
four days later, politicians in Moscow defiantly refused to curb the Chechen war. 
Yegor Stroev, chairman of the Duma's upper house, called the assembly's 
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threats "an open challenge to Russia" and vowed that, "irrespective of the PACE 
position," Russia would "tackle its conflicts on it own." (INTERFAX, 1548 GMT, 
24 Jan 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Addressing the 
assembly before its vote, Igor Ivanov, Russia's foreign minister, vowed that 
Russia would continue to fight a "barbarian invasion of international terrorism" 
that was building "the axis of its influence from Afghanistan via Central Asia and 
the Caucasus to the Balkans." (TASS, 27 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
In the end the assembly voted 83-71 not to punish Russia for its war, instead 
giving Moscow until April to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The vote was 
celebrated in Moscow's Duma as a victory for Russian firmness. "Our delegation 
[acted] quite boldly," Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the lower house committee for 
international affairs, told Echo of Moscow radio. Rogozin, however, did not 
indicate that he favored the political solution the Council of Europe sought. A 
political agreement with terrorists was impossible, Rogozin said, adding that he 
favored talks "only in the form of capitulation, or (rebels') disarmament. " (TASS, 
0957 GMT, 28 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Relations with NATO -- whose carrot, whose stick? 
If some Western institutions were considering expelling their Russian members, 
at least one -- NATO -- appeared to pine for Russia's company. Writing in NATO 
Review, George Robertson, the alliance's secretary general, welcomed Russia's 
renewed attendance at meetings on Bosnia and Kosovo, but hoped to "resume 
work on the full range of cooperative activities agreed under the Founding Act" of 
the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. (NATO REVIEW, Winter 1999; via 
www.nato.int) 
 
Robertson's plea for more attention from Russia makes it difficult to remember 
that the Permanent Joint Council was established as a concession to Russia 
when NATO expanded. Why, it might be asked, is NATO now so worried that 
Russia does not attend meetings it had sought in the first place? NATO's ardor, 
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however, seems to have made Russia coy -- and demanding. Russian leaders 
appear to be requiring exactly the "veto" over NATO actions that had been 
denied them when the joint council was founded. 
 
"Unfreezing the relations with NATO [to] a decisive degree depends not on 
Russia but on real action by the (Western) alliance," an anonymous official of 
Russia's defense ministry said. "If we manage to overcome differences on the 
situation in Kosovo, achieve an understanding within the framework of work of 
Russia-NATO Permanent Council on the Kosovo problem, [and] make sure of 
NATO's real intention of equal dialogue with Russia, the restoration of relations 
will become a reality." (TASS, 22 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
In the meantime, Russia has apparently found its own ways to gather information 
about NATO activities. After discovering bugging equipment in a Warsaw building 
owned by the Russian government and close to several Polish ministries, the 
Polish government expelled nine Russian diplomats it accused of spying. The 
Polish government said it had "found evidence of intensive spying activities 
aimed at vital Polish interests, carried out by a group of Russian citizens with 
diplomatic status.'' (THE GAZETTE (Montreal), 21 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Nor does Russia seem at a loss on where it stands in the Balkans. The foreign 
ministry condemned a recent meeting of seven of Yugoslavia's neighbors as an 
"isolationist" attempt to "create an anti-Yugoslav pact with a Euro-Atlantic bias." 
(INTERFAX, 1332 GMT, 25 Jan 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via 
lexis-nexis) Russia's most recent stand in Belgrade's defense seems to indicate 
that its partnership with Yugoslavia is strengthening. 
 
A special case 
The deepening ties between Yugoslavia and Russia are both understandable 
and worrisome. The West, Moscow and Belgrade all comprehend that Russia's 
assault on Chechnya is more ferocious than the steps Serbia took in Kosovo. If 
 5 
Yugoslavia deserved a full-scale war for its campaign against "terrorism," why 
can the West not bear even to suspend Russia from a few talking shops as 
punishment for its war? What could possibly account for the discrepancy in the 
Western response, other than the fact that Russia is a nuclear power and 
Yugoslavia is not? And if this is the reason the West has not been harder on 
Moscow, can anyone be surprised Russia relies so heavily on its nukes? 
 
If the West is both reluctant to employ sanctions against a country with atomic 
weapons and quick to bomb one that lacks them, would Russia be wrong to 
conclude that it can win new friends by extending its nuclear umbrella? And if 
Putin wins elections in part for having stood up to the West, won't he have a 
strong mandate to do it again? 
 
New leadership, but no policy change 
Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin may not be taking any foreign trips prior 
to the March elections, but plenty of foreign events will take place in Russia 
between now and then. Suggesting that the new Russian leadership will continue 
the Sino-Russian rapprochement begun by the previous administration, Putin 
welcomed Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian, and announced that China will 
be one of his first destinations after the election.  
 
In statements reminiscent of those made last July during a visit by China's 
General Zhang Wannian, Putin and Chi reconfirmed their common stance on 
international issues and bilateral cooperation, especially in the military sphere. 
(XINHUA, 19 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) Both sides will continue to oppose NATO 
interventionism and US National Missile Defense aims, as well as to promote a 
multipolar world. The diplomats followed up their rhetoric by signing an 
agreement of mutual understanding on military cooperation.  
 
If you're not a superpower, try to look like one 
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Russia is attempting to reenter the international diplomacy game after a long 
break. As expected, Moscow's meetings with Israeli and Palestinian diplomats 
last autumn did foreshadow Russia's effort to play a role in the peace process. 
(THE NIS OBSERVED, 6 Dec 99) Now Moscow is gearing up for an impressive 
gathering of foreign ministers from several continents, who will meet from 31 
January until 1 February to discuss Middle Eastern regional problems. (ITAR-
TASS, 21 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) The multilateral talks will draw an array of 
diplomats from Russia, the United States, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Canada, Japan, the Palestinian Authority and the European Union to 
discuss regional issues concerning water, trade, etc. The meeting will still be 
spun as a win for Russia, which has reasserted its role as a major international 
actor. 
 
Another impasse  
In a Cold War-style standoff, the UN Security Council reached another impasse 
over Iraqi weapons inspections despite passage of a new comprehensive 
resolution. The agreement, signed 17 December 1999, created a UN Monitoring, 
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. 
However, the bickering continues. The dispute pits the US and Britain against 
Russia and China -- and to some extent France -- over the terms of Iraqi 
weapons inspections and the appointment of a new chief. Iraq is opposed to any 
weapons inspections at all. Predictably, neither Russia nor its allies welcomed 
the appointment of a new UNMOVIC chief with direct ties to the controversial 
UNSCOM. To the Russian side, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's appointment 
of Swedish diplomat Rolph Ekeus appeared preordained. "Rolph Ekeus is 
associated with the work of UNSCOM, Russia's attitude to which is well known," 
said Russian Press Service Chief Dmitry Feoktistov. (ITAR-TASS, 1451 GMT, 18 
Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0118 via World News Connection) 
 
Russia has been Iraq's most important ally throughout the Security Council 
proceedings, acting as Iraq's economic and political lifeline. And although the 
 7 
issue was an old one even before Russia's Chechen campaign began, it is just 
another example of Russia's hard-line stance against the US and what it views 
as Western bullying. However, in the end, even if UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan appoints a UNMOVIC chief who is acceptable to all sides, Iraq does not 
seem willing to consider any monitoring at all. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Opposition parties agree to return to Duma 
Nine days after they stormed out of the first plenary session of the Third Duma 
on 18 January, the leaders of Fatherland-All Russia, YABLOKO, and the Union 
of Right Forces have agreed to allow their parties to return. They plan to return 
on 9 February. 
 
The problem was caused when it became clear that the Communists and acting 
President Vladimir Putin's party Unity had made a secret deal to divide up the 
important positions in the new Duma. Together, the Communists and Unity have 
a majority of the 450 seats. They re-elected Communist deputy Gennady 
Seleznev to the post of Duma speaker and divided up the chairmanships of the 
important committees between themselves and their close allies. Fatherland-All 
Russia, YABLOKO, and the Union of Right Forces walked out in protest. 
 
Some reports indicate that it was acting President Putin who negotiated their 
return, but it was also reported that former prime minister and leader of the Union 
of Right Forces Serge Kirienko had entered secret negotiations with Unity to 
cooperate in future Duma negotiations. It is not clear, but this may have been the 
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impetus for the other parties to return to the Duma. (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 27 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Putin creates ministerial post for government representative in the Duma 
Although there have been governmental representatives in both houses of the 
Federal Assembly in the past, they were not at the ministerial rank. Putin has 
changed this by appointing Konstantin Lubenchenko to the post of minister for 
governmental representation in the Duma. The exact title is unclear. The head of 
government administration, Andrei Korotkov, explained that Lubenchenko's job in 
the Duma is "to improve the quality of work of the government within the 
framework of the exercise of its right to legislative initiative." (ITAR-TASS, 1335 
GMT, 17 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0117) 
 
JUDICIARY 
Constitutional Court denies courts right of initiation 
The Constitution Court has ruled that Russian criminal courts do not have the 
right to institute criminal proceedings. Citing point 4 of part 1 of Article 232, parts 
1, 2 and 4 of Article 256 of the Criminal Procedural Code, and the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, the court argued that the power to initiate prosecution 
does not lie with the courts. "Giving courts powers to institute a criminal 
prosecution does not conform to the constitutional provisions on the 
independence of justice. As a body of justice, a court cannot be entrusted with 
the procedural functions of instituting criminal proceedings that are not 
characteristic to it." (ITAR-TASS, 0929 GMT, 14 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0114) 
 
The Russian Constitution clearly provides for an independent court. The 
executive branch of the federal government through the office of the procuracy is 
supposed to prosecute violators of the law and bring them before the courts for 
adjudication. The fact that the Russian prosecutor's office has not been very 
effective may have meant that the court found it necessary to take matters into its 
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own hands. Nevertheless, judicial independence, no matter how inconvenient, 
must be maintained if the law is to be equally and fairly applied. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Needed reform missing in the Russian military 
Western media reacted to acting President Vladimir Putin's approval of Russia's 
new national security concept with some concern. The document, published 14 
January, has a distinct anti-Western tone and broadens the definition of 
contingencies that permit the use of nuclear weapons. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 18 
Jan 00) However, some CIS and former Warsaw Pact countries view the 
document as just another politically profitable move to prepare Putin for the 
upcoming presidential election. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 19 Jan 00; Agency 
WPS, via lexis-nexis) A new military doctrine, which should closely resemble the 
national security concept, is under review and expected to be approved as early 
as February. (ITAR-TASS, 1333 GMT, 14 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0114, via 
World News Connection) Both documents list perceived external and internal 
"threats" to Russia's security, such as Western infringement OF Russian 
Federation interests and adverse economic conditions which foster ethnic conflict 
inside the Russian Federation. Neither document provides a framework for the 
military to organize and equip its forces to counter these new "threats," however. 
(The Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 17 Jan 00) 
 
The Russian army has not applied lessons learned during its humiliating 1994-96 
foray into the breakaway republic of Chechnya. According to former Russian 
Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, Putin's predecessor, Russia's recent invasion 
of Chechnya was planned months before August 1999. Stepashin insists the 
original plan was to occupy the northern half of Chechnya to the Terek river, 
establish full control, and lure "ordinary Chechens" to live in a better Russia. 
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Russia had sufficient forces to accomplish this objective, Stepashin said; 
however, Prime Minister Putin, with the overt support of Russia's generals, 
changed the operation's objectives and then sent an ill-prepared and -equipped 
conscript army into the urban canyons of the Chechen capital, an operation that 
continues to bleed men, money, and most importantly, morale. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 20 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) A large conscript army is not the solution to 
Russia's threats. Since Russia's generals have not proven flexible enough to 
make changes in doctrine, tactics and force composition, then it is doubtful they 
can prioritize and make tough decisions in the face of limited financial resources. 
 
Meanwhile, the Russian navy is formulating its own naval strategy to deal with 
external threats. The strategy provides a framework for a future force whose 
composition mimics the former Soviet navy. The Northern and Pacific fleets will 
feature strategic missile submarines, attack submarines, and aircraft carriers. 
The Baltic, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea flotilla will consist of smaller, 
multipurpose surface ships, minesweepers, and diesel-electric submarines. 
Another priority is maintaining combat readiness, and equipping units with 
modern weaponry and hardware to include global navigation, communications, 
battle control, and reconnaissance systems. (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Jan 00; 
Agency WPS, via lexis-nexis) To counter the US navy's maritime strategy, the 
Russian navy believes at least six aircraft carriers need to be built. (RIA, 2115 
GMT, 21 Jan 00; BBC, via lexis-nexis) Diesel-electric submarines, mines, and 
antiship cruise missiles -- weapons which Russia possesses in quantity -- can be 
very effective defending the littorals. However, the Russian navy still aspires to 
fight the US Navy with larger, more glamorous, and very expensive capital ships 
such as aircraft carriers. Even under the most optimistic scenarios, this vision is 
not achievable based on Russia's projected economic future. 
 
Finally, Russia is playing its trump card: strategic nuclear weapons. Russia's 
strategic rocket forces have received top priority. However, Russia recently has 
produced 10-15 Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles per year, and since the 
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defense ministry is already spending at least 25 percent of its budget on strategic 
rocket forces, there is probably no room to increase production. This rate is 
insufficient to replace Russia's aging arsenal and maintain existing force levels. 
(THE NIS OBSERVED, 1 Nov 99; The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, STRATEGIC BALANCE 1999/2000, Oct 99) Over 70 percent of Russia's 
intercontinental ballistic missiles are already beyond their guaranteed service life, 
which raises reliability questions. (RIA NEWS AGENCY, 18 Jan 00; BBC, via 
lexis-nexis) Although not widely reported, there have been incidents of strategic 
rockets malfunctioning during test flights. Recently, a Topol-M "turned upside-
down" following a demonstration for Prime Minister Putin. (KOMMERSANT-
DAILY, 20 Jan 00; Agency WPS, via lexis-nexis) Despite expense and reliability 
issues, Russia believes possession of strategic nuclear weapons is vital to 
maintaining world prestige and influence. Russia will cling to its nuclear weapons 
at the expense of modernizing conventional forces. In the absence of any 
document which prioritizes weapons, organization changes, and tactics, it is 
unlikely Russia's leadership will implement any much-needed reform of the 
conventional forces. 
 
Putin attempts to put his money where his mouth is 
Vladimir Putin announced on 27 January that he intended to increase military 
spending by 50 percent, thus backing his pledges to restore Russia's economic 
and military might. This increase in defense spending will be targeted at the 
military-defense industry as well as the research, development and procurement 
of new, high-tech weapons. The Russian conventional forces received very little 
in the way of weapons systems and equipment through the 1990s. The air force 
has not received any new aircraft since 1992 and is not expected to receive any, 
under the current defense planning, until 2001. The navy is slightly better off, 
having built a few, largely minor, warships. The army, on the other hand, not only 
has had to contend with antiquated weaponry but is critically short on everything 
from radios to food. (THE GAZETTE (Montreal), 28 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis, and 
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ITAR-TASS, 0754 GMT, 27 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0127, via World New 
Connection) 
 
On the surface this should bring a great sigh of relief to military officials, but upon 
closer consideration this situation raises many concerns. There is a basic distrust 
concerning political proposals to increase military spending. Constant promises 
over the last decade to raise defense budgets to reverse the disintegration of 
Russia's armed forces have gone unfulfilled, largely because of Russia's 
desperate economic situation. This time, because of recent positive economic 
growth and an increase in oil prices, Russian military leaders have some hope 
that there may actually be money to spend on the military. However, the 
enormous cost of operations in Chechnya must put this money for defense 
procurement in jeopardy. According to First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov, current costs of the Chechen war stand at about five billion rubles 
($175.8 million), exceeding planned budget expenditures of three and a half 
billion rubles. Roughly R148-150 million plus is spent monthly on the war effort. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0945 GMT, 24 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0124, via World News 
Connection) A second major concern is in the small print of Putin's policy. On 
closer examination, his plan to increase military spending does not actually mean 
the defense ministry would get more money. Rather, Putin intends merely to 
reallocate money within the current military budget to defense procurement, by 
80 percent in some categories. The existing military budget, in fact, will not 
increase at all. Of course, there are secret military allocations, but most of them 
apparently concern R&D for exotic weapons technologies.  
 
The real issue concerns not so much increases in defense procurement funding, 
but balance. The current military budget is woefully insufficient to meet the basic 
demands of the Russian military. This is not only true in terms of weapons and 
equipment procurement but across the whole spectrum of military spending: 
personnel, training, housing, recruitment, operations, etc. Putin's announcement 
to put more money into the defense procurement pot implies funds will be taken 
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out of other equally underfunded pots of defense money. Nonpayment of wages 
and salaries can be expected to continue. Lack of basic supplies, food, clothing, 
and adequate housing will continue to undermine troop morale and health. Lack 
of adequate funding for credible training will continue to jeopardize military 
capabilities. These consequences are already clearly evident in repeated stories 
of desertions, breakdowns of unit discipline, dire living conditions of troops, and 
the questionable effectiveness of military operations in Chechnya.  
 
Instead of arbitrarily committing a large amount of restricted defense dollars to 
meet a need driven by the headlines (i.e., Chechnya), Russia might be better 
advised to go back to basics and restructure its military force and budget to meet 
the country's new needs and limited resources. To do this officials must first 
determine the role of the armed forces within the context of Russian realities 
(there had been attempts to answer this question as far back as 1992); second, 
given this role, determine their necessary size, organization, and equipment; and 
last, determine the funding and allocation required to meet the new military 
structure. This is not new thinking. Russian planners have recognized this need 
for almost a decade but have had neither the commitment nor backing to carry it 
through. 
 
A third senior commander replaced 
Following on the heels of the replacement of the two senior army field 
commanders in Chechnya in early January, acting President Putin has now 
removed Col Gen Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov as commander-in-chief of the internal 
affairs ministry troops. Replacing him is Col Gen Vyacheslav Tikhomirov. 
(INTERFAX, 1251 GMT, 22 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0122, via World New 
Connection) Russian Minister of the Interior Vladimir Rushailo was quick to note 
that these were "usual personnel changes" (ITAR-TASS, 2057 GMT, 2 Jan 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0122, via World New Connection), but it is clear Ovchinnikov 
was removed due to accusations of interior troops failures in Chechnya and the 
increasing squabbles between interior and defense ministry troops. Recent 
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defense ministry reports have accused interior troops in Chechnya of failing to 
follow successful army operations with effective "mopping up" operations. The 
interior ministry troops are tasked with securing towns and villages seized by 
army units. The interior ministry reply has been to stress that its troops are not 
being properly used in Chechnya, but rather thrown into offensive operations 
even though they are only trained and equipped for law enforcement. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 28 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Col Gen Tikhomirov is a career army officer with a reputation as a strict 
commander and fierce soldier. Possibly even more important is his political vision 
regarding the Caucasus. He firmly believes that "if Russia loses its footing in the 
Caucasus, it risks losing the whole Federation." In November 99 he published an 
essay in which he said it was essential to win the war in Chechnya. If Russia did 
not, it would "lose [the public's] confidence in the government's ability to resolve 
conflicts, uphold national interests and maintain a powerful army." (STRATFOR 
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, 25 Jan 00) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Rules, what rules? 
During Boris Yel'tsin's last days in power, the CIS was a nearly moribund 
organization, plagued by ineffectiveness and dissent. Vladimir Putin's youthful 
leadership may help to resolve these problems, but at what price? At the 24-25 
January CIS Summit in Moscow, Putin's Russia displayed some of its old vigor 
and leadership, but for 11 other sovereign CIS states, the price of Russian 
leadership may be high. Illegality and secrecy -- not substantive issues -- took 
main stage at the summit.  
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In their first act, the CIS presidents elected Putin to the CIS chairmanship two 
months prior to the election in Russia. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 25 Jan 00; 
via lexis-nexis) The presidents not only acted illegally -- the chairmanship is 
meant to be filled on a rotating basis -- but with great secrecy. In a move 
reminiscent of Soviet days, they made the decision behind closed doors at two 
meetings -- one held on Monday night at Yel'tsin's Gorky-9 residence and the 
other on Tuesday prior to the official summit -- after which they announced their 
decision. Little else was accomplished at the summit, although they did sign 
several pre-approved agreements on communications and anti-monopoly 
cooperation measures. Major issues such as the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) were 
purposely shelved, while others, such as Abkhazia, were not even raised at the 
meeting. (ITAR-TASS, 25 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
As a result of the summit, Putin's Russia has retained and even strengthened its 
grip on the CIS. However, the group remains a loose organization plagued by 
inefficiency and dissent. Just because FTZ and Abkhazia were shelved for the 
time being doesn't mean they won't come up at later summits. In fact, numerous 
bilateral meetings held prior to the summit between Putin and each CIS president 
indicate that considerable effort was poured into orchestrating a smooth entrance 
for Putin onto the world stage. In the end, Putin's first foreign meeting as acting 
president may have actually raised expectations in the CIS that the second 
Russian president will bring renewed strength, vitality, and diplomatic finesse to 
the position. The next meeting has already been scheduled to follow the March 
election, at which time the CIS presidents plan to meet with the properly elected 
Putin. But, considerable work looms if Russia hopes to prevent shelved issues 
from causing problems in the future. And if they don't cause a stir, then the end of 
the CIS will be close at hand. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 




Here a parliament, there a parliament... 
If it wasn't such a potential disaster for Ukraine, it would be funny. On 21 
January, the Ukrainian parliament split into two factions: the center-right pro-
presidential majority, and the leftist coalition led by Speaker Oleksandr 
Tkachenko. Actually, it may be former Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko.  
 
After Tkachenko did not initiate a vote on a proposal by the newly created pro-
presidential majority to oust him and Deputy Speaker Adam Martynyuk, majority 
members began yelling at him, attempted to approach the speaker's rostrum, 
and, when blocked, left the chamber. (INTELNEWS, 20 Jan 00; BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) They held an alternative session the next 
day in a nearby exhibition center, where they voted to remove Tkachenko and 
Martynyuk. Tkachenko immediately called the vote illegitimate. 
 
Tkachenko was elected in July of 1998 after over two months of wrangling, and 
the rejection or withdrawal of dozens of other candidates. In the post, he has 
shown himself to be an astute politician, but one who has been able only to block 
policies, not initiate them.  
 
In the last year, as President Leonid Kuchma solidified his political power, 
Tkachenko and his fellow leftists appeared increasingly determined to block all 
presidential initiatives, no matter what the cost to the country. As reported in the 
last NIS Observed, this determination culminated in the refusal of the parliament 
to approve the Fiscal Year 2000 budget, which is a necessary step toward the 
release of suspended IMF and World Bank loan tranches. (THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 18 Jan 00) 
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It was that refusal that seemed to ignite parties opposing Tkachenko into 
solidifying their coalition. In fact, the pro-presidential majority of 241 deputies was 
announced on the same day that the budget was refused for the second time.  
 
Unfortunately for Tkachenko, it seems that the legal grounds for his refusal to 
allow a vote to remove him are questionable at best. The Ukrainian Constitution 
states, "The Verkhovna Rada [parliament] of Ukraine elected from its members 
the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the First Deputy Chairman and 
the Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and recalls them." The 
document stipulates no other conditions for "recalling" the parliament's 
leadership. Therefore, it appears that, unless the speaker's office comes with a 
power to block votes that is not detailed in the Constitution, he must allow 
deputies to vote on his removal at any time in a session. On the other hand, it 
remains unclear whether the pro-presidential majority's unsanctioned vote taken 
outside the chamber to remove Tkachenko is legal, even though a quorum was 
present. 
 
Clearly, Kuchma and his bloc in parliament are proceeding as if it is. The second 
parliament began by confirming Volodymyr Stelmakh as chairman of the National 
Bank on 21 January. Shortly after, it removed Tkachenko's bodyguards and 
disconnected his business telephones in the parliament building. (ITAR-TASS, 
1204 GMT, 21 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0121, via World News Connection, and 
RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 25 Jan 00) The actions have clearly had an effect -- if not 
on Tkachenko, then on a number of deputies. 
 
Both parliament factions -- each claiming to be the legitimate parliament -- met 
separately on 1 February to open the winter session. By that date, it was obvious 
that momentum was on the side of the pro-presidential group, as the number of 
its supporters had grown from the original 241 deputies to 259. At the session, 
these deputies voted to appoint Ivan Plyushch the new speaker of parliament. At 
the same time, however, Tkachenko was claiming that the vote to oust him was 
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unconstitutional -- presumably because it was held outside the parliament 
chambers, and without his authorization. He said, "I want to assure that I have 
never clung to this lofty chair -- I was elected to it. And I am prepared to hand it to 
another deputy if I am dismissed in strict accordance with the constitution of 
Ukraine." (REUTERS, 1 Feb 00; via America Online) 
 
Not surprisingly, Tkachenko did not comment on the constitutionality of his 
original refusal to allow deputies to vote on whether he should remain speaker. 
His is an interesting argument: "it is unconstitutional for you to vote me out 
because I didn't give you permission, even though a majority of deputies asked 
for it."  
 
As Tkachenko twists the constitution to fit his whims, Kuchma's recent 
statements of support for the newly formed majority have alleviated some 
concerns that he would use the constitution for his own purpose -- to disband the 
parliament. Article 106 of the Constitution says, "The president of Ukraine 
terminates the authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, if the plenary 
meetings fail to commence within thirty days of one regular session." If the pro-
presidential parliament were found to be illegitimate, and if Tkachenko continued 
to be unable to generate a quorum, Kuchma may have been able to use Article 
106 to his advantage. He has clearly stated, however, that he considers the 
second parliament to be legitimate, and it therefore seems unlikely that he is 
considering disbanding the body. Given the state of emergency facing Ukraine's 
energy system, it is also unlikely that Kuchma would want to go through a 
parliamentary election campaign before the 2000 budget can be approved.  
 
Tkachenko has obviously painted himself into a corner, and increased Kuchma's 
power along the way. The only way out for Tkachenko is to allow a vote to 
remove his leadership team. Tkachenko the fighter may not want to admit that, 




Not to be outdone, the parliament of the Crimea is also involved in an ongoing 
power struggle between the two government branches. This struggle, however, 
has resulted in a complete halt to all government action. The crisis began on the 
day that shall live in infamy -- 7 November, when the Communist Parliament 
Speaker Leonid Hrach apparently made disparaging remarks about Crimean 
Prime Minister Serhiy Kunitsyn. Kunitsyn responded by filing a slander lawsuit 
against Hrach, and stepping up efforts to build a coalition to topple him.  
 
Hrach was elected to the newly formed Crimean Parliament in May of 1998, after 
a standoff between Communists and a bloc of centrist parties. In a deal to end 
the standoff, Hrach was elected speaker, while Kunitsyn, leader of the centrist 
coalition, became prime minister.  
 
That tense agreement held for over a year, but the ideologies of the two 
coalitions were simply too foreign to each other. Their respective responses to 
the Tatar situation offer a prime example: Hrach fought against any special 
consideration for the Tatars and their Mejlis representatives, while Kunitsyn 
attempted to placate the group by agreeing to many of their requests for 
representation in the local government. Kunitsyn's power to address the situation 
was severely limited, however, as the Communist-controlled parliament rejected 
most laws that would have been advantageous to the Tatar population.  
 
The Communist-Centrist agreement unraveled completely on 16 December, 
when 51 out of 100 deputies voted to oust the leadership of the parliament. 
Hrach, however, has ignored that vote. On 19 January, Hrach attempted to open 
parliament's session, but could not because all 51 deputies boycotted the 
proceeding.  
 
Up until this point, Kyiv has been largely silent about the government crisis in 
Crimea, particularly since it is preoccupied with its own crisis. If the pro-
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presidential majority wins the battle for control of the Ukrainian parliament, 
however, as is likely, things could turn from bad to worse for the Crimean 
parliament. Ukraine's constitution states that, if the Crimean parliament violates 
the laws of Ukraine, the Ukrainian parliament has the right to disband it and call 
for new elections. Does not opening a session constitute violation of the laws of 
Ukraine? One would think so. Will it get that far? Probably not. Like Tkachenko in 
Kyiv, Hrach no doubt understands that there is nowhere for him to go but down 
from the presidium. Also like Tkachenko, it's just taking him a long time to 
swallow the truth -- and his pride. 
 
BELARUS 
Let us show you how much you mean to us... 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka received another not-so-subtle hint as to the 
importance that Russia places on the Russia-Belarus Union earlier this week 
when Vladimir Putin officially named Pavel Borodin as state secretary to the 
Union's supreme governing council. One day later, an international warrant was 
issued for Borodin, either charging him with money laundering, or seeking him for 
testimony in a money-laundering case, depending on which media reports you 
believe. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 28 Jan 00) Either way, Borodin is 
clearly in a whole heap of trouble. Is it possible, perhaps, that Putin saw this 
coming, and needed somewhere irrelevant to "dump" Borodin? Nah. We all know 
that the Russia-Belarus Union isn't irrelevant, don't we? After all, Lukashenka 
was just named the chairman of the supreme council. (REUTERS, 26 Jan 00; via 
America Online) Although it is unclear what his powers are, we all know that 
Lukashenka is never irrelevant, don't we? Don't we? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Kazakhstan latest target of Uzbek expansionism 
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Sections of southern Kazakhstan seem to have become the most recent target of 
Uzbekistan's now nearly year-old anti-terrorist campaign. Following the bomb 
explosions in Tashkent last February, the Uzbek government launched a 
vigorous effort to arrest and/or simply eradicate any suspected terrorist groups 
not only within Uzbekistan itself, but also in certain areas of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan's border controls also became more stringent, resulting 
in a sharp decrease in cross-border trade. However, Uzbek-Kazakh relations 
remained largely unaffected by Uzbekistan's heightened security measures until 
last month.  
 
During the first week of January a Kazakh citizen was shot and wounded while 
attempting to cross from Uzbekistan back into Kazakhstan's Sary-Aghash district. 
(INTERFAX-KAZAKHSTAN NEWS AGENCY, 1238 GMT, 11 Jan 00; BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) Uzbek border guards did not warn 
the man before they shot at him (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 24 Jan 00) and 
thus far have not offered any explanation for why they considered it necessary to 
open fire. Kazakh officials, meanwhile, have branded the shooting as "unlawful" 
and have demanded that those responsible be brought to trial. Yuri Vasilenko, 
deputy chief of the south Kazakhstan region's Internal Affairs Department, has 
stated that Kazakh law enforcement officials already know precisely who was 
responsible for wounding the man. (INTERFAX-KAZAKHSTAN NEWS AGENCY, 
1238 GMT, 11 Jan 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis) 
 
The Uzbek government has given little indication as to how this incident will be 
handled, nor has the border guard unit involved in the incident been publicly 
reprimanded. In fact, Uzbek border guard units appear to enjoy a great deal of 
latitude when it comes to enforcing Uzbekistan's "national interests." Last year 
the Kyrgyz government accused them of violating Kyrgyzstan's territorial 
sovereignty by establishing border posts inside Kyrgyz territory; on 26 January of 
this year Uzbek military personnel entered the south Kazakh region in an 
armored personnel carrier and began demarcating the Uzbek-Kazakh frontier 
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well inside Kazakh territory. By the following day, the Kazakh foreign ministry had 
sent an official letter of protest to the Uzbek government over this incident 
(INTERFAX-KAZAKHSTAN NEWS AGENCY, 0959 GMT, 27 Jan 00; BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis), but so far there has been no 
response from either the Uzbek president or his administration. 
 
Border demarcation negotiations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are 
planned for this year, but it seems that the Uzbek side decided to speed up the 
process somewhat. Unfortunately, the Kazakh government has thus far not 
reacted any more sharply than the Kyrgyz and Tajik governments did in similar 
situations. There have been no reports of a significantly strengthened Kazakh 
security presence along the Uzbek border and neither the Kazakh president nor 
the foreign ministry has informed the Uzbek government just what the 
consequences might be, should Uzbekistan's military decide to demarcate 
unilaterally additional portions of the Kazakh-Uzbek border. 
 
Uzbek military expands its sphere of influence into Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
The Uzbek government continues to pursue its foreign policy goals in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan quite aggressively, often resorting to bullying tactics and/or sheer 
force. Customs officials, border guards and security forces have become the 
ambassadors of Uzbek economic and military expansionism in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. Citing their fear that Islamic terrorists from Afghan training camps 
might attempt to infiltrate Uzbek territory from neighboring states, Uzbek officials 
have at times closed portions of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz and Uzbek-Tajik borders, 
bringing cross-border trade in certain regions to a standstill.  
 
After the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, which the Uzbek government has 
blamed on an alliance of Uzbek secular opposition groups and international 
Islamic terrorists, Uzbekistan's military began to play a more significant role in its 
relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbek security forces began entering 
Kyrgyz territory unlawfully on a frequent basis, apparently in pursuit of suspected 
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terrorists. Following the invasion of Kyrgyzstan's Batken region last fall by groups 
of armed Uzbek refugees, the Uzbek government took more drastic action and 
began erecting a barbed wire fence along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border in the 
Ferghana Valley. (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 27 Jan 00) In a further violation 
of Kyrgyz sovereignty, Uzbek border guards set up a number of checkpoints 
inside Kyrgyzstan and now monitor the activities of Kyrgyz citizens on their own 
soil. (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 24 Jan 00) 
 
Tajik officials have complained that the same thing is happening in Leninobod 
province. Anwar Kamolov, the chief of Tajikistan's new national border guard 
forces, told journalists on 18 January that at least six towns now contain Uzbek 
border posts. (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 24 Jan 00) Five of the towns which 
Kamolov named are in Leninobod province, which is still the most industrialized 
and developed part of Tajikistan, and a significant source of the republic's 
national revenue. The sixth town, Tursunzade, is located farther south in the 
"regions under republic administration," approximately 50 km west of Dushanbe, 
and happens to be the site of one of the former Soviet Union's largest aluminum 
factories. All six of these towns are situated in areas heavily populated by ethnic 
Uzbeks, and are considered by some to have stronger cultural and economic ties 
to Uzbekistan than to the central government in Dushanbe. It comes as no 
surprise, then, that some Uzbek officials may perceive these regions as 
belonging de facto to Uzbekistan and that much of the local population may 
agree. This may help explain why the local citizens have not yet driven out the 
Uzbek border guards. 
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